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EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS AND
THE VARIABILITY OF STOCK RETURNS
Abstract - This paper is concerned with the dissemination process of firm-specific annual
earnings information in the Norwegian capital market. We find a significant reduction in stock
price volatility in the post-announcement period relative to the pre-announcement period for
companies traded on the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 1990-1995. Potential explanations
for this phenomenon are tested by relating the observed return volatility to changes in the
volatility of the underlying business, the speed at which information is incorporated into stock
prices, and the amount of noise in the price process. The empirical analyses reveal no significant
changes in either the underlying business variance or the price adjustment coefficients.
However, we find a significant decline in the noise term for the largest companies after the
earnings release date, supporting the hypothesis that earnings announcements reduce
informational asymmetries among investors.
Key words: Earnings announcements, dissemination of information, stock return volatility,
variance decomposition.
1EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS AND
THE VARIABILITY OF STOCK RETURNS
INTRODUCTION
Starting with Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968), a large body of literature has
investigated the information relevance of accounting numbers in capital markets. The majority
of studies on stock markets and earnings announcements focus on information content and
timeliness - measured by changes in the characteristics of the stock return distribution (e.g.
mean, variance, and serial correlation) and trading volume - when corporate earnings are
announced to the market. Focusing on the association between earnings releases and the
variance of the stock return distribution, empirical studies typically find that the price variance is
significantly larger during the announcement period than the average variance in the non-
announcement period (see for instance Beaver, 1968; May, 1971; Hagerman, 1973; Morse,
1981; McNichols and Manegold, 1983; and Patell and Wolfson, 1981, 1984 on US data, and
Brookfield and Morris, 1992; and Pope and Inyangete, 1992 on UK data). This finding is
consistent with the claim that earnings data convey new information to the capital market.
The main hypothesis of this paper is that earnings announcements reduce informational
asymmetry among investors. The underlying factors of the stock return variances are identified
by utilizing a variance decomposition methodology. The data sample is earnings releases to the
Norwegian capital market from 1990 to 1995 for companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange.
Our research design is motivated by the fact that, as the earnings announcement date
approaches, there is usually an intensive flow of earnings-related information to the market, e.g.
via firms’ communication to analysts, analysts’ forecasts to the market, and the earnings
announcements of competitors (see Lev, 1989). Based on this flow of earnings related
information, investors continuously revise their expectations as the announcement date
approaches. These revisions are the result of the endogenous acquisition of information
regarding the forthcoming earnings announcement (see Demski and Feltham, 1994). The formal
earnings release significantly reduces the information asymmetry among investors as more
information becomes public. Consequently, we hypothesise a decrease in stock price volatility
in the post-announcement period relative to the pre-announcement period. This reasoning is
consistent with, for instance, Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988), who show that ex ante routine
2announcements increase the variance of announcement period returns, but reduce the variance
of the post-announcement period returns. Further theoretical insights into how public
announcements affect price changes and volume due to the varying precision of private
information prior to disclosures, are provided by Diamond and Verrecchia (1981, 1991),
Grundy and McNichols (1989), Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990), Kim and Verecchia (1991a,
b and 1994), Dontoh and Ronen (1993), and McNichols and Trueman (1994).
To analyze the information dissemination process around earnings announcements, we use the
price behavior model developed by Amihud and Mendelson (1987). Their model decomposes
the observed return variance into three components: i) an intrinsic variance portion that can be
attributed to the volatility of the underlying business, ii) a price adjustment component that
captures the effect of an imperfect price adjustment process, and iii) a noise term that is the
result of noise trading as well as of the impact of the trading mechanism whereby prices are set
in the market. This design provides us with a direction for empirically testing the effects of
information dissemination in the capital market. Few empirical studies have explicitly addressed
the question of changes in the underlying return-generating process around earnings
announcements. Brooks (1996), however, uses the model proposed by Hasbrouck (1991), and
finds that earnings announcements reduce the level of asymmetric information among traders.
Bid-ask spreads have been examined by Lee et al. (1993), for example. But the spread is a
function of execution and inventory costs as well as adverse selection costs, and is hence a noisy
proxy of information asymmetry.
As expected, our empirical analysis finds a significant reduction in stock price volatility in the
post-announcement period relative to the pre-announcement period. To analyze the
characteristics of stock returns - as reflected by their time series behavior - under different
information conditions, our sample was split into two test categories by company size (market
value). The literature agrees on an inverse relationship between the amount of predisclosed
information reflected in the stock price and the stock price reaction. Capitalization (Atiase,
1985, 1987; Bamber, 1987), exchange listing (Grant, 1980; Morse, 1981; and Atiase, 1987),
and the level of institutional investor ownership (Potter, 1992), have been utilized as proxies
for differences in predisclosed information. In our study, the decrease in stock price volatility
is significant for both the largest and the smallest companies.
3The decomposition procedure reveals no significant changes in either the intrinsic component
or the price adjustment coefficients. However, there is evidence of a significant decline in the
noise term for the largest companies after disclosures of accounting information. In contrast,
there is a tendency for a non-significant increase in the noise term for the smallest companies.
There are several possible explanations for these noise effects. Of interest, our findings are
consistent with discretionary noise traders timing their trades (see e.g. Admati and Pfleiderer,
1988). In large company stocks, the stock market is efficient due to the high number of
analysts following the largest companies. If an efficient market makes the liquidity traders
trade as non-discretionary noise traders, their trading would not be affected by disclosures of
public information. Nonetheless, the noise traders impact on the market would still be
reduced after the disclosure because the bid-ask spread, and thereby price volatility, is
reduced due to less private information. In small company stocks, however, the noise traders
would benefit significantly by timing their trades to the period of least informational
asymmetry, i.e. to the period after public disclosures. Since the amount of noise trading
increases in the post-disclosure period, the impact of noise in the stock price would increase,
but would be balanced by the simultaneous reduction of the bid-ask spread. This trade-off
may explain our insignificant finding of the noise term for the smallest firms. Accordingly,
our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the stock market for smaller companies is
less informationally efficient than the stock market for larger companies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the data set is presented. In the
third section, we examine the effects of earnings announcements on the stock return volatility by
estimating the pre- and post-announcement variance of the stocks’ daily return distribution.
Explanations for return-process shifts are given by estimating the intrinsic, price adjustment,
and noise components of the variance. A summary and conclusions are offered in the final
section.
DATA
The study utilizes data from the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). Compared with other markets,
the volatility of Norwegian stock prices has been high. Based on a value-weighted market
index, the standard deviation of annual stock returns for the period 1983-1994 is about 24 per
4cent in Norway, while corresponding figures in the US and UK are 12 per cent and 13 per
cent, respectively. This characteristic of the OSE may be attributed to both economic and
market-structure phenomena. First, Norway represents a small, open economy, which is
sensitive to the world market prices of its natural resources. The industry structure,
characterized by processing intermediate products rather than final goods, increases this price
risk sensitivity. In fact, Norwegian securities have been considered an attractive investment
due to this commodity price risk sensitivity. Second, since the market is smaller and
obviously less mature than the world’s largest stock markets, both market structure-related
noise and information-related noise, as well as lagged price adjustment to value changes may
be present. The methodology used in the paper, i.e. a variance decomposition approach, may
provide direct evidence on the underlying price processes in the market, and may represent a
potentially interesting approach when explaining the high volatility of OSE stock prices.
The data sample consists of 37 companies listed on the OSE with annual earnings
announcements made between 1990 and 1995. In 19 events, stocks with infrequent trading
surrounding an annual announcement date were excluded from the analysis, which yields a
sample of 203 events. As noted in the introduction, the literature agrees on an inverse
relationship between the amount of predisclosure information and the stock price reaction. To
analyze the differential impact of earnings announcements accross companies, the sample was
split into two categories by size; the smallest (19) versus the largest (18) companies, evaluated
by market value. The companies are listed in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
Daily prices for the stocks and the value-weighted market index are provided from the Amadeus
stock data base at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. All prices
are adjusted for stock splits and dividends. We calculate logarithmic returns, i.e. rt = ln(Pt) -
ln(Pt-1), where Pt is the adjusted stock price at time t. Earnings announcements dates have been
collected from the Daily Bulletin of the OSE.
5METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
To examine effects of earnings announcements on stock return volatility, we use the model of
price behavior initially formulated by Amihud and Mendelson (1987) and developed further by
Damodaran and Lim (1991) and Damodaran (1993). In this model, the observed return variance
is divided into three components: i) an intrinsic variance portion that can be attributed to the
volatility of the underlying business, ii) a price adjustment component that captures the effect of
an imperfect price adjustment process, and iii) a remaining noise term. Consequently, this
methodology provides us with a tool for empirically testing the effects of information
dissemination in the capital market.
Amihud and Mendelson (1987) distinguish between the intrinsic or fundamental value of a
security and its observed price. The price behavior is described by both market structure-related
noise and information-related noise, as well as imperfect price adjustment to value changes:
Pit - Pi(t-1) = hi(Vit - Pi(t-1)) + uit (1)
where Pit and Vit are logarithms of the observed price and the intrinsic value of stock i,
respectively, hi is a price adjustment coefficient, and uit is the noise term. The noise term comes
from two main sources: i) information-related factors (noise trading), e.g. trading-related
mispricing generated by errors in the investors’ analysis and interpretation of information, and ii)
market structure-related factors, e.g. bid-ask spreads, discreteness of stock prices (Amihud and
Mendelson, 1987: 536).
The observed variance of stock returns can be divided into three parts (Damodaran and Lim,
1991):
Var(rit) = v2i 2i + {[(hi/(2-hi)) - 1] v2i + [(2/(2-hi@ 2i} (2)
where v2iLVWKHLQWULQVLFYDULDQFHRIUHWXUQV 2i is the variance of the noise term, and the term in
brackets is the contribution to variance from an imperfect price adjustment. Thus, the first term
in (2) is the variance attributed to the volatility of the underlying business. The second term is
6the component attributed to structure- and information-related noise. The third component
reflects the adjustment of prices towards the value of the security. In particular, hi=0
represents the extreme case of no price reaction to changes in value, and 0<hi<1 represents
partial price adjustment. A unit-adjustment coefficient, hi=1, represents full, though noisy,
price adjustment. When hi>1, there is overshooting or overreaction to new information,
thereby leading to higher observed return variances.
To estimate the price adjustment factor using only the time series of returns, Damodaran and
Lim (1991) made the following assumptions:
i) the intrinsic value follows a random walk process,
ii) there is no correlation between the noise and the intrinsic value, and
iii) there exists a constant k such that the price adjustment coefficient becomes equal to one
if the length of the interval over which returns are measured is greater than or equal to k.
Although it is difficult to justify stationarity in the process for long-period returns, the first
assumption is not unreasonable for short intervals. The second assumption is a simplification in
the absence of an explicit model for the covariance between the two processes. With respect to
the third assumption, Damodoran and Lim (1991) made the choice that k=10. In their study, the
price adjustment coefficient for longer intervals rapidly approached one, even for very low or
very high values of hi.
To derive the measure of hi, the variances in different return intervals are utilized. The
coefficient rijt is firm i’s return in time period t, where each return interval is of length j. The
variance in these returns can be written (Damodaran and Lim, 1991):
Var(rijt) = {[hij/(2-hij)] jv2i + [2/(2-hij@ 2i}. (3)
Furthermore, hik = 1 implies:
2
i = -Cov(rikt, rik(t-1)) (4)
v
2i = 1/k[Var(rikt) + 2Cov(rikt, rik(t-1))], (5)
7where equation (4) is the noise variance component, measured by the serial covariance in return
intervals of length k, and equation (5) is the intrinsic variance factor. Based on equations (3),
(4), and (5), the price adjustment factor hijt for return intervals j≤k-1 can be estimated by the
time series of unit-interval return data (Damodaran and Lim, 1991), i.e.:
hij = 2 {Var(rijt)/j + Var(rikt/k)(j-1) + Cov(rikt, rik(t-1))/j}
        x {Var(rijt)/j + Var(rikt/k)(2j-1) + [2Cov(rikt, rik(t-1))]/k}-1. (6)
For a given series of return data, the value of k has to be estimated to obtain price adjustment
factors over different return intervals j. Watt et al. (1992) note that if hik=1, the series
covariance, Cov(rikt, rik(t-1)), should not include any component arising out of an imperfect price
adjustment, i.e. the covariance stabilizes to a constant value. For j<k, Cov(rijt, rij(t-1)) may include
a component arising from imperfect price adjustment. We calculate the return variance of each
stock for an event period of 125 trading days on either side of the earnings announcement date,
denoted the pre- and post-announcement period respectively. We then calculate Cov(rijt, rij(t-1))
for different j. The selected value of k is equal to the value of j at which this covariance
stabilizes to a constant value. In our sample, the covariance stabilizes rapidly for return intervals
approaching ten days, and, consequently, k is chosen as ten trading days. Hence, we assume full
price adjustment by this intervaling frequency.
The components of the return variances are estimated by using the excess return version of the
market model. Excess return for stock i on day t is defined as:
rit = Rit i iRmt) (7)
where Rit is the return on security i on day t and Rmt is the return on the Oslo Stock Exchange
YDOXHZHLJKWHGPDUNHW LQGH[RQGD\ W7KHPDUNHWPRGHOSDUDPHWHUV i DQG i are estimated
using daily returns from 250 trading days preceding the event window, i.e. from day -375 to day
-126 relative to the announcement day.
8Total risk
To examine effects of earnings announcements on stock return volatility, we start by calculating
the abnormal return variances of each stock. For each event or observation, a variance ratio
(VR) is computed by dividing the variance of the post-announcement period by the
corresponding variance of the pre-announcement period, i.e. VR = Var(r)(post)/Var(r)(pre). A
variance ratio less (greater) than one indicates that the volatility of stock returns is higher
(lower) in the pre-announcement period than in the post-announcement period. We apply an F-
test to test the significance of each individual variance ratio. A Wilcoxon test is conducted for
the hypothesis that the median variance ratio is one for the sample.
An additional approach to test for differences in total risk between the pre- and post-
announcement periods is conducted by estimating the volatility version of the market model
over the two subperiods. Schwert (1989, 1990) and Schwert and Seguin (1990) account for any
time variation in volatility by including lagged stock and market return variances. Their
approach is utilized here. In addition, the earnings announcement is included as a dummy
variable, Di, equal to zero in the pre-announcement period and to unity in the post-
announcement period, and et is the error term:
r
2
it = ai + bir2i(t-1) + cir2i(t-2) + dir2m(t) + eir2m(t-1) + fir2m(t-2) + giDi + et. (8)
This regression model is estimated for each individual stock. The null hypothesis is that the sum
of the firm-specific dummy variable coefficients is zero. The test statistic is chi-square
distributed.
To analyze the differential impact of earnings announcements across companies, the hypothesis
is tested for both the smallest and the largest companies. The results are reported in Table 2. We
learn from Panel A that the variance ratio is significantly less than one for 104 observations and
significantly greater than one for 37 observations (at the 5 per cent level). The median variance
ratio is significantly less than one for both the smallest and the largest companies. Panel B
shows a highly significant decrease in the average gi-value for both the smallest and the largest
companies. A significantly lower stock price volatility in the post-announcement period than in
9the pre-announcement period, is consistent with the hypothesis that earnings announcements
reduce the informational asymmetry among investors.
[Table 2 about here]
A decomposition of the observed variance reduction
In this section, we consider potential explanations for the overall decline in return variances
after the earnings release. Price adjustment coefficients are estimated by equation (6), and noise
and intrinsic components of the return variances are estimated by equations (4) and (5)
respective ly. The results are summarized in Table 3.
[Table 3 about here]
The first component of the observed stock return variance, the intrinsic variance portion, can be
attributed to the volatility of the underlying business. Earnings numbers per se are not expected
to influence the underlying business risk. However, if an earnings announcement is
accompanied by value-relevant information, i.e. information about the firm’s future investment
opportunities/operating risk, the market’s perception about the intrinsic variance would change
after the disclosure date. The magnitude depends on the precision of public information with
respect to the future underlying value of the firm, and the extent to which disclosed information
is already reflected in current market prices. The empirical results document no significant
changes in the intrinsic variances for either categories of companies after the earnings
announcement date (at the 5 per cent level), suggesting that earnings releases per se are not
carrying information which changes the perception of the underlying risk.
The price adjustment coefficient reflects the adjustment of prices towards the underlying value
of the security. As pointed out in the Methodology section, a unit-adjustment coefficient, hi=1,
represents full, though noisy, price adjustment to new information. However, the majority of
the price adjustment coefficients are greater than one both before and after the information
release. In general, this is consistent with an overreaction to new information, i.e. the overall
observed return variance becomes greater than the underlying variance since value fluctuations
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are amplified by traders overreacting to new information. Consequently, the high volatility in
the Norwegian stock market relative to larger, and more mature stock markets (see the
discussion in the Introduction section), is consistent with traders generally overreacting to
information.
More specifically, if markets are accompanied by different reaction patterns before and after
earnings releases, one would expect the adjustment coefficients to be different between the two
periods. We recognize a difference for the two groups of companies, with a tendency for
information to be used more intensively (increasing coefficients) after the information
disclosure for the smallest companies and more intensively (decreasing coefficients) before the
earnings release for the largest companies. However, the data do not reveal any significant
change (at the 5 per cent level) in the price adjustment factors between the pre- and post-
announcement periods. Thus, there seems to be little evidence that corporate earnings releases
per se increase the likelihood of the Norwegian market inadequately reacting to new
information.
The estimation procedure is based on the assumption that there exists a constant k such that the
adjustment coefficient becomes equal to one if the length of the interval over which returns are
measured is greater than or equal to k. In our analysis, the covariance stabilization tests suggest
that a value of k equal to ten is appropriate, and we see that hi stabilizes rapidly for return
intervals approaching ten days. But we learn from the table that h10 is greater than one, possibly
indicating that the selected value of k is too small. To increase the likelihood of h10 converging
to unity, the return intervaling frequence must be increased. However, there will be a trade-off
between the length of the observation period and the number of return intervals available.
Increasing the interval over which returns are measured will dramatically reduce the number
of observations available for estimation, or alternatively, we need a higher total number of
observations, in which case the event window must be widened. We consider both these
alternatives to be unsatisfactory. Therefore, we have estimated the price adjustment
coefficients, assuming a return interval of 10 days.
Two points are of importance when analyzing the effects of the return frequency choice. The
first concerns statistical significance. The value of h10 for the segment of the largest
11
companies and the companies combined respectively, is not significantly different from one
at a 5 per cent level either before or after the earnings release. However, the coefficient for the
smallest companies is significantly different from one at the 5 per cent level. The second
concerns biased estimates. As pointed out by Damodaran (1993: 391), if h10 (in our notation)
is greater than one, the estimates we obtain for h1 through h9 will be biased upwards. Hence,
it follows that our estimates of the pre- and post-price adjustment coefficients may be biased
upwards. With respect to these two points as well as the fact that the change in the price
adjustment coefficients between the pre- and post-announcement periods is non-significant,
we conclude that earnings announcements per se seem to have no influence on the speed of
adjustment of prices to new information.
The difference between the underlying value of a security and its observed price is
attributable to noise. This component is the result of pure noise trading and the impact of the
trading mechanism by which prices are set in the market. Noise has been explained by factors
such as errors in investors’ analyses and interpretation of information about forthcoming
company events, see e.g. Black (1986) and Schleifer and Summers (1990). In our sample,
there is evidence suggesting a significant decline in the noise term for the largest companies
in the post-disclosure period. On the contrary, there is a non-significant tendency towards
increased noise for the smallest companies. These findings are consistent with the extensive
literature relying upon Kyle (1985). In Kyle-type models, the noise component in the stock
price volatility is:
  2
 s, (9)
ZKHUH  LV WKH SULFH VHQVLWLYLW\ DQG V LV WKH DPRXQW RI QRLVH WUDGLQJ DV PHDVXUHG E\ WKH
YDULDQFHRIQRLVHWUDGLQJ7KHSULFHVHQVLWLYLW\ LVDGHFUHDVLQJIXQFWLRQRIWKHSUHFLVLRQRI
public information (see e.g. Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). If s is constant from the pre- to
WKHSRVWGLVFORVXUHSHULRG ZRXOGIDOOIURPWKHSUHWRWKHSRVWGLVFORVXUHSHULRGEHFDXVH
is falling due to the increased precision of public information. Accordingly, a reduction of the
ELGDVN VSUHDG DV PHDVXUHG E\ WKH SULFH VHQVLWLYLW\  FRXOG H[SODLQ RXU ILQGLQJ RI D
significant decline in the noise term for the largest companies.
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If, as in Admati and  Pfleiderer (1988), the noise traders are discretionary noise traders who
are able to time their trades, it would be optimal for them to concentrate their trades to the
period where the problems of informational asymmetry is minimized. Since the problem of
asymmetric information is least in the post-disclosure period, it could be optimal to cluster
WUDGHV LQ WKLV SHULRG $FFRUGLQJO\ VLQFH V LV LQFUHDVLQJ DQG  LV GHFUHDVLQJ LQ WKH SRVW
GLVFORVXUHSHULRGWKHQHWHIIHFWXSRQ FRXOGEHERWKSRVLWLYHDQGQHJDWLYH+HQFHDVPDOO
net effect, insignificantly different from zero, may be observed.
In our case, there is an insignificant tendency towards an increased noise term for the smallest
firms, which suggests that liquidity traders batch their trades in the post-disclosure period to
avoid being exploited by informed traders. For the largest companies there would be less
concentration of trades because a more efficient dissemination of information makes it harder
for privately informed traders to exploit their informational advantage, e.g. due to a
substantial number of analysts following the largest companies. Still, the noise falls from the
pre- to the post-disclosure period.
CONCLUSION
There is usually an intensive flow of earnings-related information to the market as the earnings
announcement date approaches. Investors’ expectations are consequently revised as the
announcement date approaches. The formal announcement reduces informational asymmetry, as
investors could immediately adjust to public information. Consequently, we expect a decrease
in stock price volatility in the post-announcement period relative to the pre-announcement
period. Our evidence on Norwegian data clearly supports this hypothesis by reporting a
significant decrease in stock price volatility in the post-announcement period relative to the pre-
announcement period for both the smallest and the largest companies.
Potential explanations for the change in the stock return processes are tested by decomposing
the observed return volatility into three components: the volatility of the underlying business,
the volatility caused by the speed at which information is incorporated into stock prices, and the
volatility caused by noise in the price process. First, the empirical results document that earnings
releases per se seem to have no effect on the intrinsic variance. Second, the price adjustment
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coefficients are generally higher than unity, which is consistent with the claim that the
Norwegian stock market is generally overreacting to new information. Such overreaction might
help to explain the relatively high stock return volatility observed on the Oslo Stock Exchange.
However, the change in the price adjustment factors between the pre- and post-announcement
periods is not significant for any of the estimated coefficients. Consequently, earnings
announcements per se do not seem to increase the likelihood of inadequate reactions to earnings
information. Finally, there is evidence of a significant decline in the noise term after earnings
announcements for the largest companies. This empirical result is consistent with the hypothesis
that reduced noise can be attributed to reduced informational asymmetry among investors.
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TABLE 1
List of Companies Included in the Analyses
_______________________________________________________________________
Category A: Smallest companies Category B: Largest companies
Company name        Market value* Company name       Market value*
_______________________________________________________________________
Bergens Skillingsbank    414 Aker   2167
Bjølvefossen   169 Awilco     839
Blom   116 Bergesen d.y.   6571
Chr. Bjelland & Co.   260 Den norske Bank   7993
Eidsiva   113 Elkem   2860
Grand Hotel   313 Ganger Rolf     924
Gyldendal Norsk Forlag   682 Hafslund Nycomed   5716
Kverneland   672 Havtor   1594
Moelven Industrier   540 Kværner   7231
Nordlandsbanken   459 Norsk Hydro 60993
Porsgrunds Porselænsfabrik     80 Norske Skogindustrier   3354
Simrad   370 Olav Thon Eiendom   1041
Simrad Optronics     82 Orkla   6868
Skiens Aktiemølle   217 Rieber & Søn   2058
Stentofon       5 Saga Petroleum   4949
Tandberg     92 Uni Storebrand   4802
Tomra Systems   509 Unitor   2179
Vard   527 Wilh. Wilhelmsen   1589
Veidekke   658
_______________________________________________________________________
Average value   330 Average value incl. Hydro   6874
Average value ex. Hydro   3690
_______________________________________________________________________
* Market value in NOK mill.
TABLE 2
Excess Return Variances Before and After Earnings Announcements
Panel A: Variance ratio (VR) of excess returns.
___________________________________________________________________________
    Smallest      Largest        All
   companies    companies    companies
___________________________________________________________________________
Mean VR       0.8918       1.0060       0.9474
Median VR       0.7336       0.8304       0.7867
No. of VR significantly
greater than 1*         19          18         37
No. of VR significantly
less than 1*         55          49        104
Wilcoxon test p-value
for the hypothesis that
median VR is 1       0.010       0.004       0.000
___________________________________________________________________________
Panel B: Market model in volatility, with earnings announcements as a dummy
variable (Eq. 8).
___________________________________________________________________________
    Smallest      Largest         All
   companies    companies    companies
___________________________________________________________________________
Mean gi-value      -0.00137      -0.00023      -0.00078
χ2 test p-value for the
hypothesis that the sum
of gi-values is 0       0.000       0.000       0.000
___________________________________________________________________________
*
 Significant at the 5 per cent level
TABLE 3
Components of Observed Excess Return Variances
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 Smallest companies            Largest companies  All companies
 Before  After Change p-value  Before  After Change p-value  Before  After Change p-value
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
a) Intrinsic variance (Eq.5)  0.0015  0.0025  0.0010   0.45  0.0004  0.0006  0.0002   0.35  0.0009  0.0015  0.0006   0.35
b) Noise (Eq. 4)  0.0003  0.0026  0.0023   0.13  0.0013  0.0001 -0.0012   0.04*  0.0008  0.0012  0.0004   0.60
c) Price adjustment
coefficients (Eq. 6)
 1 day    0.01    1.73    1.72   0.61   -7.40    4.08  11.48   0.70   -3.90    2.98    6.88   0.66
 2 days    8.25  12.71    4.46   0.64  17.90    1.02 -16.88   0.22  13.60    6.22   -7.38   0.40
 3 days    1.43    2.40    0.97   0.22   -1.40    7.00    8.40   0.15   -0.14    4.94    5.08   0.12
 4 days    1.39  14.70  13.31   0.32    2.08    1.19   -0.89   0.08    1.77    7.24    5.47   0.36
 5 days    1.82    2.88    1.06   0.46    1.36    1.53    0.17   0.21    1.57    2.14    0.57   0.38
 6 days    1.29    1.50    0.21   0.44    1.26    1.00   -0.26   0.46    1.27    1.23   -0.04   0.83
 7 days    1.69    3.39    1.70   0.22    1.41    1.39   -0.02   0.70    1.54    2.28    0.74   0.23
 8 days    1.39    1.38   -0.01   0.79    1.37    0.83   -0.54   0.33    1.38    1.07   -0.31   0.32
 9 days    1.44    1.40   -0.04   0.32    1.40    1.35   -0.05   0.21    1.42    1.37   -0.05   0.11
10 days    1.36    1.38    0.02   0.36    1.40    1.29   -0.11   0.05    1.38    1.33   -0.05   0.13
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*
 Significant at the 5 per cent level
